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1 Introduction
Across countries, high life expectancy is associated with high income per capita. The question
whether improvements in life expectancy cause increases in per capita income is the subject
of a lively debate, however. Lorentzen et al. (2008), exploit exogenous variation in mortality
across countries and find that life expectancy causally leads to faster economic growth.1
Exploiting exogenous changes in mortality in the context of the epidemiological transition,
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) come to opposite results: improvements in life expectancy
mainly trigger faster population growth, but have a negative causal effect on income per
capita. These findings have very important implications for academic research as well as for
the policy debate since they challenge the view that reducing mortality and improving health
is beneficial also for economic development.2
This paper addresses the question of the causal effect of life expectancy on economic
growth from the perspective of the recent literature on unified growth in which the demo-
graphic transition has been shown to play a central role for the transition from stagnation to
growth. This leads us to focus attention on the largely unexplored issue of the appropriate
specification of the empirical analysis, rather than concentrating exclusively on the problem
of the econometric identification in linear regression frameworks. From a theoretical per-
spective, the effect of life expectancy on income per capita is generally ambiguous. Lower
mortality may increase the productivity of available resources thereby increasing total pro-
duction.3 Lower mortality may, on the other hand, accelerate population growth and thereby
reduce growth in income per capita in the presence of Malthusian effects.
The analysis of the appropriate empirical specification is motivated by the stylized facts
about the dynamic evolution of mortality, fertility and population growth over the course of
the, so called, “demographic transition”. A key feature of the demographic transition is that,
after an initial increase, the natural rate of population growth eventually falls in association
with reductions in mortality and fertility.4 The implications of this demographic transition for
economic development have been recently investigated by economists that study the transition
from stagnation to growth within a unified framework following the seminal contribution by
Galor and Weil (2000). An important implication of the non-monotonic population dynamics
along the demographic transition is that the negative effects of population growth may be
1 Findings of a positive effect of life expectancy on income per capita based on cross-country regressions
are reported by Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup et al. (1999), and Bloom et al. (2003), among others. The
works by Shastry and Weil (2003), Weil (2007) and Ashraf et al. (2008) exploit a different strategy and use
calibrations based on microeconomic estimates to infer the role of health improvements for income per capita.
The results suggest positive, but comparably small, effects on income per capita.
2 Beyond the effect of life expectancy on income, reductions in mortality may increase individual well being
directly by extending the lifetime horizon or the quality of life, as investigated, e.g., by Becker et al. (2005) or
Murphy and Topel (2006). In this paper we exclusively concentrate attention on the effect of life expectancy
on individual well-being through changes in income per capita.
3 Theories studying the positive effects of life expectancy on income production (abstracting from changes
in fertility) include de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000), Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002), Boucekkine et al. (2002), Boucekkine et al. (2003), Lagerlöf (2003), Cervellati and Sunde (2005),
Bar and Leukhina (2011), among others. The works by Bleakley (2007), Bleakley and Lange (2009) and
Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009) provide robust evidence that better health and higher life expectancy
increase educational attainments at the individual level.
4 These non-monotonic patterns of population growth and fertility have been widely documented across dif-
ferent countries and times as discussed in Sect. 2, and they are also apparent in the sample of countries studied
in this paper.
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at work before, but not after, the onset of the demographic transition.5 The literature has
also pointed out that life expectancy may accelerate income growth after the onset of the
demographic transition by affecting the age structure of the population and the dependency
ratio, by improving educational attainment and by increasing female labor force participation
in association with reduced fertility.6 Finally, it has been documented that the reliance on fix
factors of production, which may be responsible for congestion effects, is typically larger
for countries at low levels of economic and demographic development (see Weil and Wilde
2009). Taken together, these arguments suggest that the demographic transition is a crucial
turning point for many direct and indirect channels through which life expectancy affects
income per capita. As consequence, the effect of life expectancy on income per capita may
be ambiguous before the demographic transition, but should be unambiguously positive after
its onset.
We investigate this hypothesis using the same cross-country panel data for the period
1940–2000 as in the influential paper by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). As preliminary
analysis, we study the dynamic patterns of life expectancy and fertility to identify the onset
of the demographic transition in each country in the sample, based on the classification criteria
used in the demography literature. In line with the previous literature, we find that the dynamic
patterns are consistent with the stylized dynamics of the demographic transition. About half
of the countries in the sample had already experienced the onset of the demographic transi-
tion by 1940. In these countries, which we call “post-transitional” in the remainder of this
paper, increases in life expectancy after 1940 went along with reductions in both fertility and
population growth. In the other countries, which we call “pre-transitional”, improvements in
life expectancy were associated with increases in population growth after 1940.7
To estimate the causal effect of life expectancy on income growth, we use the specifi-
cation and identification strategy based on the predicted mortality instrument proposed by
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) as benchmark. This identification strategy exploits exogenous
variation in life expectancy due to the epidemiological transition after 1940. The analysis is
also performed using the alternative instrumentation proposed by Lorentzen et al. (2008).
We allow for heterogenous effects of life expectancy during the process of development by
applying different empirical strategies. After showing that neglected non-linearities cannot
be rejected in linear models estimated on the pooled sample, we adopt empirical specifi-
cations that allow for different effects of life expectancy depending on whether a country
5 Galor and Moav (2002) study the role of survival and natural selection for the fertility transition. Theories
where greater life expectancy causally leads to a reduction in fertility include Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), which
also explicitly shows that changes in fertility may lead to non-monotonicities in income per capita growth,
Boldrin and Jones (2002), Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), Soares (2005), Strulik (2008) and Bar and Leukhina (2010);
see Galor (2005, 2010) for comprehensive surveys of the literature. Whether reductions in mortality are indeed
causal for fertility reductions is still debated in the empirical literature.
6 The role of dependency ratios is studied in Bloom et al. (2003), and the interaction between fertility and
labor force participation is investigated by Bloom et al. (2009). Soares (2005), Cervellati and Sunde (2007),
de la Croix and Licandro (2007) provide theories where life expectancy increases investments in human capital
in association with a reduction in fertility. Falcão and Soares (2008) extend the analysis of female labor force
participation and fertility by Galor and Weil (1996) to the consideration of the role of life expectancy.
7 Notice that, strictly speaking all countries are at different stages of their demographic transition in 1940. We
call those countries “post-transitional” that had already experienced the onset of the transition by 1940 by the
criteria from the demography literature discussed below, even if they might not have completed the transition
(that is, even if they might still exhibited fertility above reproduction levels). Symmetrically, we call the other
countries “pre-transitional”. This is discussed in more details in Sect. 2.
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was pre-transitional or post-transitional already in 1940, that is, before the treatment of the
epidemiological transition. The specification estimated by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) is
therefore nested in this approach, which relaxes the constraint that the effect of life expectancy
on income growth is identical in pre-transitional and post-transitional countries.
The results document a strong and robust positive causal effect of life expectancy on
income per capita in post-transitional countries, which is complemented by a significant
negative effect on population growth. The opposite findings emerge for pre-transitional coun-
tries, although the negative effect on income is sometimes insignificant. The equality of the
causal effects in pre-transitional and post-transitional countries can generally be rejected.
The positive effect in post-transitional countries is larger than the average effect reported
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), and opposite in sign. The analysis delivers qualitatively
identical results when using the instruments proposed by Lorentzen et al. (2008). These find-
ings document that the different results reported in the literature are not due to the different
identifying variation, but due to the different sample composition in combination with linear
empirical models that impose the effect of life expectancy to be identical across all countries
in the sample. This is also documented using a linear estimation framework in the full sample
but varying the weights of the different countries based on their demographic situation in
1940, without having to rely on a classification of the countries’ demographic development
in 1940. Simple decompositions further document that the differences in GDP growth can be
mainly attributed to the difference in coefficients across pre-transitional and post-transitional
countries, rather than to different variations in life expectancy or different time trends. The
results are confirmed by a series of robustness checks including the consideration of alterna-
tive classifications of countries, the instrumentation of the demographic status of the different
countries in 1940 using time invariant geographical characteristics and the inclusion of ini-
tial conditions in terms of GDP per capita and life expectancy, among others. The finding
of a heterogenous effect of life expectancy on income per capita and population growth in
pre- and post-transitional countries emerges consistently. Taken together, the results strongly
support the view of long-run economic development as a non-linear process that is closely
linked to non-monotonic population dynamics. These findings are complemented by addi-
tional evidence showing that increases in life expectancy causally increase the probability of
observing the onset of the transition leading to lower fertility and birth rates.
The results contribute to the literature on the role of health for economic growth by
accounting for the differential effects of life expectancy during the different phases of demo-
graphic development. Despite the existence of several theoretical arguments that can be used
to motivate the hypothesis, these heterogeneous effects have not been documented systemat-
ically. The findings also help reconciling the seemingly contradictory empirical results in the
literature by explicitly showing that they are not due to different instrumentation strategies
but rather a consequence of a restrictive econometric specification together with a particu-
lar sample composition. In a broader perspective, the results are relevant for the empirical
growth literature by highlighting the importance of accounting for non-linearities, or even
non-monotonicities, in the development dynamics when conducting growth regressions over
long periods of time. Finally, in view of the fact that most developing countries have recently
experienced the onset of the demographic transition, the results have relevant policy impli-
cations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays down the testable hypothesis and the
estimation framework. Section 3 describes the data and the identification strategies. Section 4
presents the results and some robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes. Additional material
is relegated to an Online Appendix.
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Fig. 1 The demographic transition
2 Testable hypothesis and estimation framework
2.1 The demographic transition and its implications for the empirical specification
A common feature of all episodes of the demographic transition is that the correlation between
life expectancy and fertility eventually becomes negative. Already the early writers noticed
that mortality reductions generally preceded the fertility reductions, although the delay of
the fertility decline compared to the mortality reductions differed across European countries.
A large body of research devoted to identifying the specific differences in the transition pro-
cess and their timing across regions and countries has documented the stylized facts that also
apply to subsequent transitions.8 As pointed out by Kirk (1996, p. 367) also “in non-European
countries, the regularities are impressive. In every instance mortality has declined first and
has been followed by declining fertility, and the result in each case has been a considerable
acceleration in population growth”.
The stylized textbook pattern of the demographic transition is presented in Fig. 1.9 Pre-
transitional countries are characterized by high mortality and fertility, reflected by high death
and birth rates. The growth rate of population is generally positive but small. According to
the typical representation, the demographic transition starts with a reduction in mortality
rates, MT, while birth rates remain high. With some delay, fertility also drops, marking the
onset of the fertility transition, FT, which represents the important turning point for popu-
lation growth. The delay between MT and FT induces the typical hump-shaped pattern of
population growth, which initially increases due to the lower mortality but eventually slows
down since reduced fertility more than compensates the mechanical increase in population
in response to lower mortality rates.10
8 Thompson (1929) was first in highlighting the unprecedented marked reduction in mortality and fertility
rates within a fairly short period of time in the late 19th and early 20th Century in some Western countries.
Subsequently, Landry (1934), Carr-Saunders (1936), and Notestein (1945) presented the first wave of sys-
tematic cross-country investigations of patterns of mortality, fertility and natural rates of population growth
and initiated the study of the demographic transition as a leading topic of modern scientific demography.
The European Fertility Project organized by Coale materialized in a massive study of fertility declines in 600
European administrative divisions in Europe between 1870 and 1960.
9 Figure 1 reproduces Fig. 1.1 from Chesnais (1992) and Fig. 4.2 from Livi-Bacci (1992). These patterns are
also used as base for population forecasts by e.g. the UN and the World Bank. For surveys on the demographic
transition and its economic implications see also Lee (2003), and Galor (2005).
10 Notice that the figure plots crude birth and death rates, that is, the total number of births and deaths divided
by the size of the total population alive at each point in time. In the initial phase after MT, the birth rates
decline slightly as consequence of the increase in population size although total fertility is unchanged. If death
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Fig. 2 Demographic dynamics and income growth
Increased life expectancy might have a negative effect on growth in income per capita
if it accelerates population growth, for instance in the presence of Malthusian mechanisms.
In fact, this is the main explanation by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) for their finding of
a negative causal effect of life expectancy. In all countries that undergo the demographic
transition, however, increases in life expectancy are eventually negatively associated with
population growth. This observation is crucial, because if an increase in life expectancy
leads to lower fertility and population growth, then the negative effects of life expectancy on
per capita income growth cannot be at work after the demographic transition, irrespective of
the actual mechanism behind the demographic transition. Furthermore, as discussed above,
the reliance on fixed resources appears more important at low levels of development and the
non-Malthusian mechanisms that imply a positive relationship between life expectancy and
growth are expected to gain momentum after the onset of the demographic transition. Taken
together these observations jointly support the main testable hypothesis which is illustrated
in Fig. 2: the effect of life expectancy on income per capita can be negative only before the
onset of the demographic transition.
2.2 Theoretical illustration
The main hypothesis can be illustrated within the framework of Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007). Consider a closed-economy in continuous time t , where a unique consumption good
Y is produced with a constant returns to scale aggregate production function
Yt = (At Ht )α L1−αt (1)
where 0 < α < 1 and Lt denotes factors of production like physical capital or land, which are
assumed to be fixed and independent from life expectancy.11 The aggregate human capital is
supplied inelastically and is given by Ht = ht Nt , where ht denotes the (average) individual
level of human capital and Nt is population size; At represents the level of technology (or
productivity). Denote by Tt the level of life expectancy. In Acemoglu and Johnson (2007),
the role of life expectancy for total factor productivity and human capital is assumed to be
iso-elastic, At = AT θt , with θ ≥ 0, and ht = hT ηt with η ≥ 0.
Footnote 10 continued
rates fall predominantly among young ages, crude birth rates might even increase slightly, without crucially
affecting the overall pattern.
11 Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) show that considering a full adjustment of the capital stock only implies a
larger effect of life expectancy on income per capita growth since the constraint of a fix factor of production
is less binding.
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The population growth rate depends on the net rate of reproduction, which is given by
the total (planned) fertility rate nt net of mortality up to fertile age, 1 − pt (ϕ). The mean
age of reproduction (or mean length of a generation) is ϕ while pt (ϕ) is the probability of
surviving until ϕ. The fertility rate nt measures the number of children that would be born to
an individual over her lifetime if that individual were to survive throughout her reproductive
life, i.e., until ϕ. The net rate of reproduction can be approximated by N R Rt = nt pt (ϕ).12
An increase in life expectancy has two main effects on population size. First, lower mortality
mechanically increases population size since more people survive at each point in time.13 In
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) this is reflected by the iso-elastic reduced form relationship
ln p (ϕ) = λ ln Tt with λ > 0. Second, greater longevity may lead to changes in planned fer-
tility. Following Fig. 1, assume that fertility initially does not react (or even slightly increases)
in response to increasing life expectancy but eventually drops after the onset of the demo-
graphic transition. This change in fertility behavior, and consequently population growth,
can be simply captured by considering an iso-elastic relationship also for fertility, with the
elasticity depending on whether the country is pre- or post-transitional in terms of its demo-
graphic transition (FT): ln nt = ln b + x j ln Tt for j = {pre, post} with x pre ≥ 0 > x post
and |x post | > |λ|, where b > 0 represents factors that influence the level of fertility but are
unrelated to life expectancy. The demographic transition is characterized by a reduction in
fertility rates that more than compensates the mechanical effect on population size, which
leads to a reduction in population growth rates in association with a reduction in mortality
rates.
Using these expressions in (1), the level of log per capita income is therefore given by
ln yt = α ln At + α ln ht − (1 − α) ln Nt + (1 − α) ln Lt (2)
or
ln yt = π j ln Tt + Bt , (3)
where Bt is a constant.14 The parameter of interest linking log per capita income to log life
expectancy, π j , is given by
π j = α(θ + η) − (1 − α)
(
x j + λ
)
≷ 0 , (4)
with j = {pre, post}. Equation 4 illustrates the main source of ambiguity concern-
ing the role of life expectancy for income per capita. The negative “population effect”
−(1 − α) (x pre + λ) < 0 implies an ambiguous effect of life expectancy on income per
12 The net reproduction rate, N R R, is the average number of daughters that would be born to a woman if she
survived through her fertile age and conformed to the age-specific fertility and mortality rates. Equivalently, the
N R R can be interpreted with reference to the whole population as the expected total number of children that
the representative individual has during her fertile life. The specification used here, which neglects variations
in age specific mortality for simplicity, is generally seen a good approximation of the net rate of reproduction,
see also (Preston et al., 2001, p. 115).
13 A second, more indirect, mechanical effect arises if the likelihood of surviving until childbearing age
increases. These effects are qualitatively identical but the direct effect has only temporary consequences, since
it affects the level of population but not its long-run rate of growth (see Preston et al. 2001, pp. 158–159).
14 Consider an initial period t0 = 0 with N0. Population at time t > t0, after a period t = t − t0, can then
be expressed as Nt = N0
[
N R R tϕ
]
which is the linear version of the relationship between the population
growth rate and N R R in the Lotka stable population model (see Preston et al. 2001, p. 152). In one generation,
t = ϕ, the population grows exactly by a factor N R R. Making use of the definition of N R R and taking
logs, one can rewrite the condition as ln Nt = [ln N0 + ln (t/ϕ) + ln b] + x j ln Tt + λ ln Tt , which implies
that Bt = (1 − α) ln Lt + α
(
ln A + ln h) − (1 − α) (ln N0 + ln(t/ϕ) + ln b).
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capita before the transition, π pre ≷ 0. After the transition, however, the effect is unambig-
uously positive, π post > 0, as population growth falls in response to improvements in life
expectancy, such that −(1 −α) (x post + λ) > 0. As discussed above, this non-monotonicity
is complemented by a successively lower reliance on fixed factors of production as the level
of development improves, as well as by the possible acceleration in income per capita due
to the changes in the age composition, the education attainment or labor force participation
triggered by increases in life expectancy after the demographic transition. Extending the
model to explicitly account for these mechanisms would leave the testable implications
unchanged.
2.3 Estimation framework
Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the main estimation framework can be derived
directly from the theoretical illustration presented above. The estimation is in long differ-
ences, i.e., using panel data with only two observations per country, (1940 and 1980, or 1940
and 2000).15 Adding an error term, and separating countries i by their demographic status
j = {pre, post} as of 1940, we can use condition (3) to derive the following estimation
framework
ln y ji t = π j ln T jit + ζ ji + μ jt + c j + ε ji t (5)
for pre-transitional and post-transitional countries, respectively. The time invariant and coun-
try-specific components of the expressions that are functions of parameters are picked up by
the country fixed effects ζi , while time varying factors which are common to the different
(groups of) countries are picked up by time fixed effects, μ j . The common time dummy con-
trols for global changes in the main variables of interest over the observation period, which
are similar across countries of group j = {pre, post}. The coefficients π pre and π post are
the respective parameters of interest. As in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the consideration
of a long-difference regression with two observations per country with t = {0, 1} implies that
the estimation of the previous equations is equivalent to the estimation of the first-difference
specification
 ln y ji = π j ln T ji + μ j + u ji , (6)
where  ln y ji = y ji1 − y ji0 and  ln T j ≡ ln T j1 − ln T j0 . Note that, in principle one might
or might not allow for differential time trends, μpre and μpost , across pre-transitional
and post-transitional countries. Allowing for two distinct time trends, μpre and μpost
as in Eq. 5, implies estimating a fully-interacted model.16 This model is equivalent to esti-
mating the specification of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) separately for pre-transitional and
post-transitional countries. Restricting the time trend to be the same for pre-transitional and
post-transitional countries, μpre = μpost , implies estimating a semi-interacted model
that only allows for a differential effect in terms of π in pre-transitional and post-transitional
15 The choice of a forty years horizon is justified by the fact that changes in fertility behavior and population
are likely to take place over the course of generations and, therefore, need a sufficiently long observation
period to become effective and detectable. Changes in life expectancy that take place at some point in time
after 1940 may affect fertility in the following decades and should be captured by 1980 or 2000, but potentially
not before.
16 Note that the size of the time trend μ j also depends on the time interval, that is the term
− (1 − α) [ln (t2) − ln (t1)] which results from taking first differences, where t2 ≡ t2 − t0 and
t1 ≡ t1 − t0, where t0 = 1940, t1 = 1980 and t2 = 2000, regardless of whether estimating a common time
effect or allowing for different time effects in both pre-transitional and post-transitional countries.
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countries.17 Below we will investigate both alternatives. Recall that from Fig. 2 and the theory
above, we expect π pre ≷ 0 and π post > 0. Recall also that if total fertility n were assumed
to be constant or unrelated to life expectancy, then
π pre = π post = π = α (θ + η) − (1 − α)λ ≷ 0 . (7)
This coincides with the coefficient estimated by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), which means
that their model is nested in the specification above, and which therefore allows for testing
the equality of coefficients obtained with pre-transitional and post-transitional samples.
3 Data and identification strategy
The main outcome variables are GDP per capita and population size; the main explanatory
variable is life expectancy at birth. The essential data sources are the UN Demographic Year-
book, and Maddison (2003), see also Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) for details. The base
sample consists of 47 countries for which all relevant data on life expectancy and the out-
come variables, as well as on the on the predicted mortality instrument that is used to identify
causal effects, are available for 1940 and 1980 (or 2000).
3.1 The empirics of the demographic transition
The demography literature has proposed several criteria to identify whether a country has
reached the critical turning point of the demographic transition in light of the stylized facts
reported in Fig. 1, see e.g., (Chesnais, 1992, p. 19):
C1 Life expectancy at birth exceeds 50 years;
C2 Fertility or the crude birth rate has exhibited a sustained decline;
C3 The crude birth rate has fallen below the threshold of 30/1000.
The first criterion implies that a country enters the demographic transition when mortality
is sufficiently low. The conventional threshold for life expectancy at birth is taken to be 50
years. Second, the fertility transition can be identified by a sustained decline in total fertility
or crude birth rates. Third, a country is considered post-transitional if the crude birth rate
is sufficiently low, and in particular below 30 births per 1000 inhabitants.18 In the empiri-
cal application we call a country post-transitional or pre-transitional depending on whether
it satisfies these criteria by 1940 or not, respectively. Ideally, one would take into account
17 The semi-interacted model follows from an estimation framework
ln yit = π pre ln Tit + π post ln Tit · Posti + ζi + Posti + μt + c + εi t
where the level of demographic development is indicated by the time-invariant binary indicator Posti , which
takes value 1 if a country is classified as post-transitional by 1940, and zero otherwise. Notice that this indicator
is not identified in levels due to the inclusion of country fixed effects. Taking long differences then delivers as
estimation equation
 ln yi = π pre ln Ti + π post ln T · Posti + μ + u ji
in which, in contrast to (6), the time trend μ is not allowed to vary by demographic status j = {pre, post}.
18 The first criterion is expected to be, on average, the least restrictive one in defining post-transitional coun-
tries because the drop in mortality usually precedes the drop in fertility. The second criterion is less restrictive
than the third criterion since it classifies a country as post-transitional when the sustained fertility reduction
has started although the process may not be complete (so that the crude birth rate may be still above 30/1000).
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whether the country experiences an exogenous change in life expectancy while it is still pre-
transitional, or already post-transitional, at the time of treatment. However, the data using the
epidemiological revolution to construct the predicted mortality instrument used in the anal-
ysis below only contain country-specific information for the predicted change in mortality
over the full period. We therefore consider a classification of countries into pre-transitional
and post-transitional as of 1940, i.e., before the treatment in terms of the mortality reduction
due to the epidemiological revolution. In the sample of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the
application of each of the three different criteria leads to the same classification and delivers
25 pre-transitional and 22 post-transitional countries in 1940.19
We apply the three classification criteria also in 1980 (and 2000). This allows us to distin-
guish countries that entered the demographic transition during the observation period 1940–
1980 (and 1940–2000), from countries that remained fully pre-transitional throughout the
observation period. We use these classifications to investigate the hypothesis that reductions
in mortality facilitate the demographic transition in the countries that are still pre-transitional
in 1940. As expected, all post-transitional countries in 1940 remain post-transitional during
the entire observation period, while some previously pre-transitional countries undergo the
demographic transition after 1940.20 Finally, for comparability, we also apply the classifica-
tion of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) according to which countries are grouped by initial
income in 1940 (rich and non-rich countries). This classification can be justified by the fact
that the economic and demographic transitions tend to be closely related. It is important to
notice, however, that this classification does not directly relate to the theoretical argument
based on the demographic transition presented above.
3.2 Preliminary analysis
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. Average life expectancy at birth in 1940 is 49.3 in
the full sample but is 38.8 and 61.2 years in pre- and post-transitional countries, respectively.
The respective average crude birth rates (CBR) in the two groups were 45.3 and 20.4. By
1980 life expectancy increased to 62.3 and 73.7 while the CBR dropped to 32.5 and 14.1,
respectively. Figure 3 depicts the levels of log life expectancy and crude birth rates for all
countries in the years 1940, 1960, 1980 and 2000. There are two clearly distinct groups of
countries, with countries that are pre-transitional in 1940 displaying the largest increases in
life expectancy and the largest reductions in the CBR. The changes in the CBR are negative
for all countries with the largest reductions being observed for the countries with intermediate
increases in life expectancy.21 These patterns are consistent with those emerging from Fig. 1.
19 To verify the second criterion we follow Reher (2004) and consider a country to be post-transitional if it
has entered the falling trend in terms of the 5-year averages of crude birth rates by the year 1935. His classi-
fication coincides with the second criterion with the exceptions of Greece, Ireland and New Zealand, which
are not classified in Reher (2004). In the case of Greece the problem is the lack of reliable data before 1950.
Ireland and New Zealand display a very flat profile of crude birth rates around 30/1000 after 1940 and a clear
drop only in 1980 and 1960 respectively. In our baseline classification we consider these three countries as
post-transitional in 1940 since they clearly satisfy criteria C1 and C3. The robustness of the results, is checked
by applying alternative criteria as discussed in details in the Online Appendix. This Appendix also presents
a table that summarizes the different classifications, and a figure that provides a graphical illustration of the
demographic dynamics underlying these criteria by depicting the crude birth rates of all 47 countries in the
sample over the period 1940–2000.
20 A table that reports the baseline classification of the countries into post-transitional, intermediate (under-
going the transition between 1940 and 1980), and pre-transitional throughout 1940–1980, together with the
two robustness classifications can be found in the Online Appendix.
21 The countries with initial life expectancy close to 50 years are closest to the onset of the transition and,
accordingly experience the largest cumulative reductions in fertility, see also Fig. 11 in the Online Appendix.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Year Base sample Pre-transitional countries Post-transitional countries
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Life expectancy at birth 1940 49.3 12.7 38.8 6.17 61.2 5.38
1980 67.6 7.41 62.3 6.25 73.7 1.70
2000 72.9 5.46 69.1 4.65 77.4 1.55
Predicted mortality 1940 0.47 0.28 0.65 0.23 0.27 0.17
Log GDP per capita 1940 7.74 0.73 7.21 0.50 8.34 0.39
1980 8.62 0.95 7.91 0.72 9.44 0.29
2000 8.96 0.96 8.22 0.68 9.81 0.32
Log population 1940 9.11 1.53 9.03 1.80 9.20 1.20
1980 9.81 1.48 10.0 1.68 9.55 1.20
2000 10.1 1.49 10.4 1.63 9.67 1.21
Log GDP 1940 9.94 1.59 9.34 1.58 10.6 1.32
1980 11.5 1.49 11.0 1.49 12.1 1.31
2000 12.1 1.55 11.8 1.68 12.6 1.30
Crude birth rate 1940 33.6 13.2 45.3 4.17 20.4 3.70
1980 23.9 10.7 32.5 6.57 14.1 3.27
2000 17.5 6.86 22.4 5.63 11.9 2.37
Sample sizes are 47 countries in the base sample, 25 pre-transitional countries and 22 post-transitional coun-
tries. The classification follows criteria 1, 2 and 3 described in the text
To gain a further visual impression, we illustrate the dynamic evolution of the average
crude death rates, crude birth rates and natural rate of population growth in the two groups of
countries. Figure 4a depicts the variables for the countries which are already post-transitional
before 1940. Crude death rates are about 12/1000 in 1940, decline by about 25% until 1960,
and stabilize afterwards.22 The crude birth rate and the net rate of population growth decline
by about 50% by 1980 and keep decreasing until year 2000. Figure 4b plots the respective
series for countries which are still pre-transitional in 1940. For these countries, the average
crude death rate in 1940, which is around 20/1000, shows a clear negative trend. Death rates
are reduced by about 50% in 1970 when they reach 10/1000, which is about the average death
rate of post-transitional countries in 1940. After 1970, death rates drop by about 20% in the
next twenty years and eventually stabilize. The crude birth rate is essentially unchanged until
1960 and displays a sizable decline only after 1970. Accordingly, the natural rate of popula-
tion growth is initially increasing and displays a sustained decline only after 1970. By 1990,
the natural population growth rate is still about the same as in 1940. Figure 4 illustrates the
different phases of the demographic transition as empirical counterpart to Fig. 1. Reductions
in mortality breed larger population growth until the onset of the demographic transition,
but this trend is reversed afterwards and turns negative for post-transitional countries. It is
noteworthy that only after 1970 the time series of pre-transitional countries resemble those
of countries which are already post-transitional in 1940.
Figure 5 depicts the change in log population from 1940 to 1980 (panel a), and from 1940
to 2000 (panel b) against the change in log life expectancy at birth over the respective period.
22 Life expectancy at birth keeps increasing although the crude death rate stabilizes due to the increase in the
share of elderly in these countries. The shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3 Life expectancy and crude birth rates for the years a 1940, b 1960, c 1980 and d 2000. Classification
according to criteria 1, 2, 3, see Table 6 (Appendix Online) and main text for detailed description of the
classification criteria. Data source: UN population statistics
(a) (b)
Fig. 4 Demographic dynamics in a post-transitional and b pre-transitional countries. Average evolution of
crude birth, death and natural population growth rates. Classification according to criteria 1, 2, 3, see Table 6
(Appendix Online) and main text for detailed description of the classification criteria
Panels (c) and (d) show the corresponding graphs for the relationship between the change
in log GDP per capita and changes in life expectancy. Considering the pooled sample, the
figures show a clear positive relationship between changes in life expectancy and population
growth, and a clear negative relationship between changes in life expectancy and GDP per
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5 The consequences of the demographic transition for development. a Change in log life expectancy
and change in log population 1940–1980. b Change in log life expectancy and change in log population
1940–2000. c Change in log life expectancy and change in log GDP per capita 1940–1980. d Change in log
life expectancy and change in log GDP per capita 1940–2000. Changes in log life expectancy on the changes
in GDP per capita and population. Classification according to criteria 1, 2, 3, see Table 6 (Online Appendix)
and main text for detailed description of the classification criteria
capita growth. Due to the estimation framework in long differences with country and year
fixed effects, this is essentially the variation that identifies the effect of interest in the study
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). However, in line with Fig. 1 the effect on population
growth rates differs in pre-transitional and post-transitional countries. The figure shows two
separate groups of countries, one characterized by small changes in population and life expec-
tancy, and the other by large changes, with different effects of life expectancy within each
of these two groups. When considering the additional information in Fig. 5 by investigat-
ing separately pre-transitional and post-transitional countries, it appears that pre-transitional
countries experienced larger increases in life expectancy, but were associated with a lower
growth in GDP per capita. In contrast, in post-transitional countries, larger improvements
in life expectancy were associated with faster growth in income per capita. In this context
it is worth noting that the different slopes also imply different intercepts, which essentially
capture different conditional time trends in population and income growth across the two
subgroups of countries.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 6 Predicted mortality changes and changes in life expectancy (a 1940–1980, b 1940–2000). Classifica-
tion according to criteria 1, 2, 3, see Table 6 (Online Appendix) and main text for detailed description of the
classification criteria.
3.3 Identification strategies
We use the predicted mortality instrument proposed by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) as
benchmark to identify the causal effects of life expectancy. This instrument exploits infor-
mation on the reduction in mortality due to the epidemiological revolution. The instrument
for the change in life expectancy is the reduction in mortality from 15 of the most important
infectious diseases following the epidemiological transition in the 1940s. Three components
of the epidemiological transition motivate this instrument: the wave of drug and chemical
innovations that led to effective vaccines and medicines for major diseases (like antibiot-
ics to treat the diseases, or chemicals like DDT to eradicate their transmission vectors); the
establishment of international institutions like the WHO or UNICEF that facilitated the dis-
tribution of medical and public health technology; and, finally, the change in international
values leading to a fast dissemination of medical knowledge. The validity of this instrument
relies on the assumption that the exclusion restriction holds, namely that the instrument is
exogenous to a particular country’s level of economic development and does not affect income
or population through other channels than life expectancy. This requires, in particular, that
mortality from these diseases is exogenous for lack of appropriate treatments in 1940, and
due to the worldwide dissemination of treatment and prevention by 1980.23
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between the predicted mortality reductions due to the
epidemiological transition, and the changes in life expectancy. Larger absolute reductions in
predicted mortality are associated with larger changes in life expectancy in both pre-transi-
tional and post-transitional countries. Notice that the predicted mortality variable implies that
a more negative realization (a larger drop in mortality) is associated with a larger increase
in life expectancy. This is a first indication that the instrument appears to be relevant for all
countries as expected from the extensive analysis of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Figure 7
depicts the change in log population and GDP per capita from 1940 to 1980 (left panels)
and from 1940 to 2000 (right panels), against the predicted mortality reduction due to the
23 Essentially, the exclusion restriction in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) is based on the view that no treatment
or vaccine existed worldwide for the respective diseases captured by the mortality instrument as of 1940, such
that the mortality due to these diseases entirely depended on country-specific features that are unrelated to the
error term in the growth regression. The exclusion restriction also assumes that mortality from these diseases
dropped in all countries independently of their economic development due to the nature of the epidemiological
transition, i.e., due to the discovery and the world-wide dissemination of drugs and vaccines.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 7 Predicted mortality changes and changes in income and population. a Change in log population 1940–
1980. b Change in log population 1940–2000. c Change in log GDP per capita 1940–1980. d Change in log
GDP per Capita 1940–2000. Effect of changes in predicted mortality changes (instrument by Acemoglu and
Johnson (2007) on changes in income per capita and population. Classification according to criteria 1, 2, 3,
see Table 6 (Online Appendix) and main text.
epidemiological transition. This figure complements Fig. 5 in showing that log population
is decreasing with predicted mortality reductions in post-transitional countries, while pop-
ulation growth is accelerated in pre-transitional countries, as can be seen in Panels (a) and
(b). In fact, similar to the pattern shown in Fig. 3, the largest reductions in mortality occur in
pre-transitional countries with the largest levels of crude birth rates, so that the result is an
initial increase in population growth. The differential effect of life expectancy on population
growth in pre-transitional and post-transitional countries is larger over the longer time hori-
zon as illustrated in Panel (b). Panels (c) and (d) of Figs. 5 and 7 show that the changes in log
GDP per capita are large and increasing in predicted mortality in post-transitional countries,
while they are lower and decreasing in predicted mortality in pre-transitional countries over
both time horizons.
The hypothesis of a non-monotonic effect of life expectancy on growth is based on theoret-
ical considerations in light of demographic transition theory, and should therefore not rely on
a particular identification or estimation strategy. In fact, it is not clear to which extent endoge-
neity problems of income on life expectancy should affect the predicted non-monotonicity in
the relation between life expectancy and income. We therefore also present the corresponding
OLS results when accounting for the possibility of heterogeneous effects of life expectancy.
Given the debate about the seemingly contradictory findings in the literature that have been
obtained using identifying variation across and between countries, we also present estimates
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that use as an alternative identification strategy the instrumentation proposed by Lorentzen
et al. (2008). Their approach exploits cross-country variation in the health environment as
measured by a malaria ecology index, as well as 12 Koeppen-Geiger climate zones, mean
distance of centroid from coast, mean latitude of centroid, mean elevation and log country
area in square kilometers.24
4 Causal effect of life expectancy on income growth
This section tests the hypothesis that the causal effect of life expectancy on income growth
is different for different levels of demographic development. We first estimate models that
account for the status of countries as pre- or post-transitional as of 1940 based on the infor-
mation presented in Sect. 3, in order to test whether the effect is significantly different across
pre-transitional and post-transitional countries. In light of the typical pattern of the demo-
graphic transition, we also test the hypothesis that improvements in life expectancy increases
the likelihood of observing the onset of the demographic transition. In addition, we perform
a series of robustness checks.
4.1 Causal effects in pre- and post-transitional countries
Table 2 presents the main results regarding the causal effect of life expectancy for GDP
per capita, using information for the period 1940–1980 in Panel (A) and for 1940–2000 in
Panel (B). Column (1) replicates the analysis by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). The average
effect of an increase in life expectancy, instrumented by predicted mortality reductions, on
income per capita is significantly negative. The explanation for this finding can be seen in the
respective column of Table 3, which contains the corresponding results for population growth
as dependent variable and shows a significant positive effect of increases in life expectancy
on population growth. We test for neglected non-linearities applying RESET test methods,
see Pesaran and Taylor (1999) and Wooldridge (2002, p. 124–125). These tests indicate that
the null of no neglected non-linearities is generally rejected over the period 1940–1980: the
null is rejected against an alternative of a non-linear specification with a quadratic (cubic)
polynomial in the case of population with p-values of 0.046 (0.017), and with p-values of
0.538 (0.012) in the case of GDP per capita.25
The causal effect of life expectancy for pre- and post-transitional countries is investigated
using both the partially and the fully interacted model. We consider both specifications since
the partially interacted model is more efficient but also more restrictive.26 Recall that the
classification of countries is pre-treatment in terms of the predicted mortality instrument
since it refers to the period pre 1940 and is time invariant. The differential effect of changes
24 The malaria ecology index combines “climatic factors and the presence of different mosquito vector types
and human biting rates of different mosquito vectors”, see Lorentzen et al. (2008) and Sachs et al. (2004) for
details.
25 The respective p-values for the period 1940–2000 are 0.057 (0.048) for population and 0.693 (0.460) for
GDP per capita. The non-linearities appear to be even stronger in the OLS specifications with log life expec-
tancy or the predicted mortality instrument as explanatory variables, where the null is typically rejected on
the 5% level. Finally, unreported RESET tests do not reject the null of no neglected non-linearities for aggre-
gate GDP growth in any specification. The effect of life expectancy on aggregate GDP growth is therefore
approximately linear, and, as found by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), positive but small. Detailed results are
presented in Table 8 in the Online Appendix.
26 As shown before, the partially interacted model involves the estimation of only one common time effect
on the full sample but, in view of (6), it imposes the restriction that μpret = μpostt .
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in mortality in the partially interacted model is therefore captured by including an interaction
between changes in log life expectancy and the dummy that identifies the countries as pre- or
post-transitional. The corresponding estimation results of the differential effect of changes
in life expectancy on income per capita growth over the period 1940–1980 are reported in
column (2) of Table 2. The effect of life expectancy on income per capita is negative for
pre-transitional but positive and significant for post-transitional countries.27 The results for
the fully interacted model, reported in columns (3), are qualitatively identical. In line with
the hypothesis, these results suggest that the effect of improvements in life expectancy on
per capita income growth differs substantially between pre-transitional and post-transitional
countries, with a negative insignificant effect for pre-transitional and a positive significant
effect for post-transitional countries. The point estimates are larger in size in the fully inter-
acted model, with a causal effect of life expectancy on income that is almost twice as large,
but of the opposite sign, compared to the average effect obtained with the pooled sample.
This result is complemented by a causal effect with opposite signs on population growth, as
can be seen from the corresponding columns in Table 3.
The bottom part of Tables 2 and 3 presents test statistics for the first stage performance
of the instrument (F-statistics of excluded instruments and Shea’s partial R-square statis-
tics). As a consequence of the smaller sample sizes in the fully interacted model (which is
equivalent to splitting the sample), the first stage partial F of the instrument becomes smaller,
but, by and large, the instrument performs fairly well, as was to be expected already from
the extensive tests provided by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). The Shea’s partial R-square
statistic is also reasonably high, usually around 0.3 or above, indicating that the instrument
explains a substantial part of the variation in the instrumented variable.
The results from OLS estimates are presented in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Tables 2 and
3. The OLS estimates deliver coefficients that are of the same sign as the IV estimates and
that are slightly smaller in absolute magnitude across all specifications.28 The differences
between OLS and IV results tend to be larger for pre-transitional countries. This is confirmed
by Hausman-type endogeneity tests that reject the null of exogeneity of log life expectancy in
the pooled sample and in the pre-transitional samples. However, the null of exogeneity cannot
be rejected for the samples of post-transitional countries. One possible explanation for this
finding is that life expectancy is measured with larger error in pre-transitional countries, in
particular as of 1940. In this context, the instrumentation might help reducing the incidence
of attenuation bias particularly in this sample, as is suggested by the larger discrepancies
between OLS and IV results for pre-transitional countries.29 This does not affect the finding
of different signs of the causal effect for pre-transitional and post-transitional countries, but
suggests, if anything, that the estimates are more reliable for post-transitional countries.
To investigate the role of the different instrumentation strategies, we replicate the analysis
by using the instruments suggested by Lorentzen et al. (2008) instead of Acemoglu and John-
son’s predicted mortality change instrument. In the present context of two observations by
27 Recall that, since the effect is presented in terms of an interaction with a dummy, the effect for the post
transitional countries is given by the sum of the two coefficients.
28 We also repeated the whole analysis with in an intention to treat specification using the predicted mortality
instrument rather than log life expectancy as regressor of interest. The results are qualitatively identical and
are available upon request.
29 On this point see also (Lorentzen et al., 2008, p. 103). The vital statistics on which life tables are based are
often incomplete or missing. These measurement and registration problems are particularly severe in coun-
tries where the vital registration system is deficient, where a sizable proportion of the population has never
attended school, or in countries where infant mortality is very high, see, e.g., (United Nations, 1983, p.2). As
consequence, errors associated with the indirect projection measures that are used to produce life tables might
be more severe in developing countries, i.e., countries that are pre-transitional as of 1940.
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country and considerable convergence in life expectancy, the change in life expectancy and
the initial level of life expectancy contain very similar information. In fact, the correlation
between log life expectancy in 1940 and the change in log life expectancy over the period
1940–1980 is −0.95, and −0.98 over the period 1940–2000. Moreover, the logic behind this
instrument is similar to the Acemoglu and Johnson’s predicted mortality instrument, which
essentially exploits cross-country variation in mortality in 1940 from the particular diseases,
while assuming that this mortality has been reduced to zero in all countries by 1980. Conse-
quently, the set of instruments proposed by Lorentzen et al. (2008) appears valid for changes
in life expectancy in the application under consideration. The respective results are reported
in columns (7), (8) and (9) of Tables 2 and 3. These results are qualitatively identical to the
results obtained with the instrumentation of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). In particular, as
with the predicted mortality instrument, the effect of life expectancy on income per capita
is negative (although lower in magnitude) with the linear specification in the full sample.
The results change once the constraint that the effect must be the same for all countries is
removed, however. The effect of life expectancy on growth is non-monotonic with respect
to the demographic status of a country: positive for post-transitional countries and negative,
but generally non significant, for pre-transitional countries.
These results imply that the negative effect in the pooled sample and the heterogenous
effect in pre- and post-transitional countries do not depend on the particular identification
strategy, since they hold with the predicted mortality instrument proposed by Acemoglu and
Johnson (2007), with OLS, and with the instruments suggested by Lorentzen et al. (2008).
Moreover, these results suggest that the opposite findings obtained by Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007) and Lorentzen et al. (2008) do not depend on the use of different instruments, but
rather on the estimation of a linear specification that is estimated on samples with different
composition regarding pre-transitional and post-transitional countries.
Throughout the different estimations, the effects of life expectancy on GDP per capita
have consistently opposite signs for pre- and post-transitional countries. For post-transitional
countries, the results show a positive effect on GDP per capita, but a negative effect on pop-
ulation growth. Estimating a fully interacted model allows us to perform specification tests
on a nested model and makes the results more directly comparable to the results obtained
from the pooled and partially interacted specifications. In some cases, the partially interacted
model appears to be more appropriate, but most importantly, the results consistently suggest
that the effect of life expectancy is heterogeneous across pre-transitional and post-transitional
countries. This is illustrated by statistics of Chow-tests of equality of π pre = π post in the
two samples that are reported in the bottom of the panel and that represent a direct test of
condition (7). In most cases, the effects of life expectancy on income per capita appear to be
significantly different in the pre-transitional and post-transitional countries, and in the cases
where the null of equal coefficients is not rejected in the fully interacted model, we find a
strongly positive effect of life expectancy for post-transitional countries in the semi-interacted
model. The results over the longer period 1940–2000, reported in Panels (B) are qualitatively
identical to those for 1940–1980 although the coefficient estimates are generally larger. The
different effects of life expectancy on per capita GDP in pre-transitional and post-transitional
countries are not driven by the length of the observation period. Also in the corresponding
estimates for log population presented in Table 3, the equality of the effect of life expectancy,
π can generally be rejected.
Given the estimation in first differences, the common time trend represents the estimate
of the constant of the regression in changes, and essentially captures the average change of
the dependent variable over the period 1940–1980. A significant value of the common time
trend can be interpreted as the change in log income (or population) that is unrelated to the
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differential changes in life expectancy within each sample. The positive values of the common
time trend reported in Table 2 imply a positive average increase in per capita income over
the period 1940–1980, which appears to be larger for pre-transitional countries, consistent
with a convergence process. The time trend is almost three times larger in pre-transitional
countries compared to post-transitional countries over the period 1940–1980. In restricting
the time trend in post-transitional countries to be the same as in pre-transitional countries,
the partially interacted model underestimates the effect of life expectancy as is indicated by
the larger estimates obtained with the fully interacted model.
4.2 Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions
To investigate whether the variation in growth rates across pre-transitional and post-transi-
tional countries results from different variation in life expectancy, or from different coef-
ficients at different stages of the demographic transition, one can decompose the predicted
difference in GDP growth following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973).30 The difference in
predicted log GDP per capita growth between pre-transitional and post-transitional countries
over the period 1940–1980, ̂ ln yi
post − ̂ ln yi pre, is 1.09 for the specification in column
(3) of Panel (A) of Table 2. This difference can be decomposed into a conditional con-
vergence process, reflected in the relatively higher time trend estimate for pre-transitional
(underdeveloped) countries, with an difference in the coefficients of ̂μpost − ̂μpre =
0.66 − 3.31 = −2.65. Also, the larger average improvement in life expectancy in these
countries of  ln T pre −  ln T post = 0.59 − 0.24 = 0.35, evaluated at the coefficient
estimate for post-transitional or pre-transitional countries, favors pre-transitional countries
over post-transitional countries.
The difference in the coefficient estimates, i.e., the distinct causal effects of life expectancy
on income per capita in pre-transitional and post-transitional countries, however, exacerbates
the differences in incomes, and even leads to substantially larger predicted growth differ-
ences than what is actually observed. Depending on the base category, the corresponding
difference in predicted growth is  ln T post [πˆ post − πˆ pre] = 0.59[2.29 − (−5.45)] = 4.54
when evaluated at the average change in pre-transitional countries,  ln T pre = 0.59, or
 ln T post [πˆ post − πˆ pre] = 0.24[2.29 − (−5.45)] = 1.84 when evaluated at  ln T post =
0.24.31 These decomposition results are essentially unaffected by the classification criterion
one adopts. Hence, in the absence of differential time trends and characteristics that favor pre-
30 In terms of specification (6), the decomposition can be written as
̂ ln yi
post − ̂ ln yi pre
=
(
 ln T post −  ln T pre
)
πˆ post +  ln T pre (πˆ post − πˆ pre) + (̂μpost − ̂μpre)
=
(
 ln T post −  ln T pre
)
πˆ pre +  ln T post (πˆ post − πˆ pre) + (̂μpost − ̂μpre) ,
where  ln T j denotes the mean change in life expectancy in sample j , which are  ln T pre = 0.59 and
 ln T post = 0.24 for the period 1940–1980, and the πˆ j reflect the respective coefficient estimates as dis-
played in column (3) of Panel (A) of Table 2. Due to the fact that the predicted mortality instrument does not
vary in the second observation period by construction, it is not possible to apply a dynamic decomposition
approach, e.g., following Juhn et al. (1993).
31 As shown by Elder et al. (2010), the coefficient estimate of a group indicator in a pooled sample represents a
weighted average of the unexplained gaps from the two Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, providing a summary
statistic for the unexplained component of the growth gap.
123
124 J Econ Growth (2011) 16:99–133
transitional countries, the heterogeneity in the causal effects would imply a larger difference
in growth rates across the sub-samples than what one observes in the data.
4.3 The role of sample composition
As documented above, the opposite findings obtained by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and
Lorentzen et al. (2008) are not due the application of different instrumentation strategies.
In the presence of non-monotonic effects, the application of a linear estimation framework
may deliver misleading results since the estimates are very sensitive to the sample compo-
sition in terms of pre- and post-transitional countries. The role of the sample composition
can be illustrated by giving different weights to the different countries by maintaining the
linear estimation framework as Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). Specifically, after ordering
the countries according to their initial conditions in terms of initial life expectancy (or crude
birth rates in 1940) we estimate the model on the pooled sample after assigning weights to the
different observations according to a weighting function. This function gives higher weight
to countries with similar initial conditions as a particular reference country, as compared
to countries with more dissimilar initial conditions.32 This procedure delivers information
on the effect of life expectancy using the full sample, but it accounts for the role of the
different stages of demographic development by giving different weights to countries in dif-
ferent stages of the demographic transition without relying on any classification criteria or
thresholds.
If the hypothesis of different effects of life expectancy at different stages of the demo-
graphic transition is false, the procedure should deliver similar results regardless of the coun-
try used as center for the weighting. The results, summarized in Fig. 8 for GDP per capita and
in Fig. 9 for population, show that this is not the case.33 The estimated effect of life expectancy
on growth is monotonically increasing the greater the weight given to post-transitional coun-
tries. In particular, the effect is positive when a large weight is given to countries with large
initial life expectancy (or low crude birth rates) and negative when the large weight is given
to the countries at the other extreme. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of
life expectancy on income per capita differs depending on the initial level of life expectancy
and crude birth rates. The opposite picture emerges for population growth rates which are
negative for post-transitional and positive for pre-transitional countries. Consistent with the
typical patterns summarized in Fig. 1, the effect of life expectancy on population growth is
hump-shaped and largest when giving weight to intermediate countries that are those most
likely to enter the demographic transition shortly after 1940. When ordering the countries in
terms of initial income the results are qualitatively similar but the estimates are more similar
to the un-weighted results estimated by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). This further suggests
32 In the limit, giving zero weight to a country is equivalent to excluding it from the sample. In the estimation,
we use a log-logistic weighting function of the form 1 − axb/(1 + axb), where x measures the distance in
ranks with respect to the reference country’s initial conditions, and a, b > 0 are smoothing parameters. This
weighting function is illustrated in Fig. 12 in the Online Appendix. This specification of the weight function
has the advantage of allowing for comparable weights to countries with relatively similar initial conditions, in
the example within a range of about 20 countries, but assigning rapidly decreasing weights to countries outside
this range. The procedure delivers 47 estimates from estimating the model for each single country as center
for the weighting function. Notice that the quantitative results depend on the choice and parametrization of
the weighing function. The results are therefore meant as an illustration of the role of sample composition.
33 The figures plot the coefficient estimates of π and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals against
the position that the respective country at the center of the weighting function takes in the ranking of initial
conditions. Initial conditions are ordered by demographic development (increasing initial life expectancy and
decreasing in initial crude birth rates). The larger variation in the estimates at the boundaries of the support is
due to the symmetric weighting, which implies a lower effective sample size at the boundaries.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 8 Weighted estimates: causal effect of life expectancy on income per capita. a Effect for 1940–1980.
Countries ordered by LEB 1940. b Effect for 1940–1980. Countries ordered by CBR 1940. c Effect for 1940–
2000. Countries ordered by LEB 1940. d Effect for 1940–2000. Countries ordered by CBR 1940. Results from
2SLS regression using the specification by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) on the full sample. The regressions
are weighted using the log logistic function depicted in Figure 12 (Online Appendix). Countries are ordered
according to ascending life expectancy at birth (LEB) and descending in crude birth rate (CBR) in 1940, and
iteratively used as center for the weighting function as discussed in the text
that the more relevant ordering refers to demographic conditions and that what matters is the
different stages of the demographic transition rather than the level of development per se.
By demonstrating the consequences of sample composition for the estimates obtained with
a linear specification, these results also illustrate how accounting for non-monotonic effects
can reconcile the different results on the causal role of life expectancy for growth that have
been found in the literature.
4.4 Life expectancy and the demographic transition
From Figs. 3 and 4 it is evident that some pre-transitional countries undergo the demographic
transition during the observation period. To investigate the hypothesis that increases in life
expectancy might be causal for reducing fertility and triggering the demographic and eco-
nomic transition, we estimate linear probability models of whether or not a country has
undergone the demographic transition in the period after 1940. The dependent variable takes
value 1 if a country passes from being pre-transitional in 1940 to being post-transitional in
1980 (or 2000) and it takes value 0 otherwise. We use the same identification strategy based
on the predicted mortality instrument. The validity of the exclusion restriction that the instru-
ment (the predicted drop in mortality due to the epidemiological revolution) is exogenous to
123
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 9 Weighted estimates: causal effect of life expectancy on population. a Effect for 1940–1980. Countries
ordered by LEB 1940. b Effect for 1940–1980. Countries ordered by CBR 1940. c Effect for 1940–2000.
Countries ordered by LEB 1940. d Effect for 1940–2000. Countries ordered by CBR 1940. Results from
2SLS regressions. The weighting function is discussed in the text and reported in Figure 12. Countries are
ordered according to ascending life expectancy at birth (LEB) and descending in crude birth rate (CBR) in
1940, and iteratively used as center for the weighting function as discussed in the text.
the outcome of interest (the probability to undergo the demographic transition) and affects
the outcome through no other channel than through its effect on life expectancy, is essentially
based on the same assumptions as in the benchmark analysis.
The results are presented in Table 4. Panel (A) contains the results for undergoing the tran-
sition during the observation period 1940–1980, while panel (B) shows results for the period
1940–2000. Column (1) shows that an increase in life expectancy significantly increases the
probability of a country that has life expectancy at birth below 50 years in 1940 to undergo a
transition to life expectancy above 50 by 1980 (panel (A)) or by 2000 (panel (B)). The results
of columns (2) and (3) document that larger life expectancy also increases the probability
of observing a demographic transition when applying the criterion of a sustained fertility
drop and crude birth rates below 30/1000. With regard to a transition in crude birth rates, the
effect is positive and insignificant over the shorter horizon, but positive and significant over
the longer horizon (see Panel (B)), which might have to do with the lower number of transi-
tions (8) according to this criterion over the short horizon. For robustness and completeness,
columns (4)–(6) report the respective estimates when using the instrumentation strategy by
Lorentzen et al. (2008). The results are qualitatively identical and even stronger. Overall,
the results suggest that an increase in life expectancy appears to significantly increase the
probability that a country undergoes the demographic transition.
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4.5 Robustness
This section discusses the results of several robustness checks, including the use of alternative
classification criteria, the instrumentation of the initial demographic status and the explicit
consideration of initial conditions. The details are reported in the additional material in the
Online Appendix.
4.6 Robustness to alternative classification criteria
The results are qualitatively identical when using alternative classification criteria. The main
difference is that the negative effect on income grow in pre-transitional countries is some-
times statistically significant (see Table 9 in the Online Appendix). When countries are
classified in terms of their initial income levels the results are qualitatively similar. As shown
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the effect of life expectancy on income per capita is sig-
nificantly negative for the poor and middle income countries. They are, however, positive for
the high income countries (see Table 10 in the Online Appendix). This should be expected
in view of the close link between economic and demographic development that underlies
most of the unified growth literature. It should be noted, however, that it is well documented
in the literature, that the demographic transition may take place for quite different levels of
income and in very different socio-economic environments, see Kirk (1996). For example,
in 1940 several European countries are classified as non-rich although they were clearly
already post-transitional (the sub-sample of non-rich countries isolated by Acemoglu and
Johnson 2007, includes 36 countries, eleven of which where already post-transitional in
terms of the demographic criteria). The findings are consistent with the role of demographic
dynamics that one would expect from the literature cited above. While the findings do not
provide a proof that initial demographic conditions are more relevant than initial income in
explaining the heterogenous effects documented above, it is not straightforward to think of
a consistent explanation for why the effect of life expectancy on income growth should be
opposite depending on the level of initial income per se, beyond (and differently from) the
role of the demographic variables discussed above. The different effects of life expectancy
on population growth are, in turn, clearly related to population dynamics. Together with the
results of the weighted estimations presented in Sect. 4, the findings overall suggest that the
explicit consideration of the role of the demographic transition, and the associated population
dynamics, are important factors for the interpretation of the findings beyond the role of initial
income.
4.7 Instrumenting the status of the demographic transition
The initial demographic status, whether a country is pre-transitional or post-transitional in
1940, is pre-determined with regard to the epidemiological revolution and the growth in
population or income per capita after 1940. Nevertheless, in order to investigate whether
the results are affected by potential endogeneity of the demographic status, we also esti-
mated models in which the status of pre-transitional or post-transitional is instrumented
by using the set of geographical instruments proposed by Lorentzen et al. (2008). These
instruments exploit cross-country variation that strongly correlated with initial life expec-
tancy in 1940. The identification assumptions are essentially the same ones made by
Lorentzen et al. (2008), with the only difference that the instrumented variable is binary
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rather than continuous. The results are presented in Table 5.34 The findings provide the
same qualitative picture: improvements in life expectancy have a positive effect on income
per capita growth in post-transitional countries, but no significant effect in pre-transitional
countries. This is complemented by a significant negative effect on population growth in post-
transitional countries, but a positive effect on population growth in pre-transitional countries.
The lower parts of the different panels report first stage statistics and suggest that the instru-
ments work well for both change in life expectancy and demographic status. The estimates
are similar to those obtained when treating the transition status as exogenous, and they are
robust to the use of different classification criteria.
4.8 Initial conditions
We also investigated the robustness of the results with respect to controlling for initial condi-
tions.35 The results suggest that the finding of differential effect in pre- and post-transitional
countries does not depend on the omission of initial conditions. They support the hypothesis
of (stronger) positive effects of improvements in life expectancy on income per capita for post
transitional countries, while the opposite holds for population. Notice that this specification
does not directly relate to the testable implications derived in Sect. 2 in view of the available
theory and evidence. Also, the specification with initial life expectancy cannot be derived
by taking differences of the specification in levels as is done in Sect. 3 and is therefore not
directly comparable to the specification in levels with country fixed effects as in Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007) and the analysis performed above. Finally, in the present context of a
long panel with only two observations per country, the change in life expectancy and the
initial conditions contain very similar information and are highly correlated by construction.
This makes it difficult to discriminate the effects of changes of life expectancy and of initial
levels.36
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the causal effect of life expectancy on income per capita and
tested the hypothesis that the effect may be non monotonic: possibly negative before the
demographic transition but unambiguously positive after its onset. The hypothesis emerges
from the economic and demographic literature that views long-run economic development as
closely related to the non-monotonic population dynamics associated with the demographic
transition. The recent unified growth literature provides several arguments suggesting that
increasing life expectancy may lead to negative effects on growth in incomes per capita only
before the demographic transition, i.e., when life expectancy increases population growth.
34 Tables 11 and 12 in the Online Appendix present the respective results for the alternative classification
criteria.
35 Controlling for initial life expectancy to account for convergence and level effects has been proposed by
Bloom et al. (2009) and Aghion et al. (2011). As instrument for initial life expectancy in 1940, we use again the
instruments suggested by Lorentzen et al. (2008). The estimation results for income per capita and population,
respectively, are shown in Tables 13 and 14 in the Online Appendix.
36 The respective estimation results of specification (1) of Table 13 (Online Appendix) deliver coefficients
of 3.72 and 3.06 for the change and initial level of life expectancy, respectively, which are not statistically
different from each other. Also, the first stage regressions reveal that the instruments load fairly similarly on
changes and initial levels, with the geographical instruments by Lorentzen et al. (2008) exhibiting slightly
larger effects on changes than the predicted mortality instrument by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). The
standard errors increase fivefold compared to the baseline specification in Table 2.
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Table 5 Causal effect of life expectancy: instrumenting the demographic status as of 1940
Period 1940–1980 1940–2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel (A): log GDP per Capita
Ln Life Exp. 0.198 1.273** −0.418 −0.273 −0.224 −1.901
[0.326] [0.618] [0.726] [0.483] [1.122] [1.306]
Ln Life Exp.*Post 2.679*** 2.682*** 1.942** 4.143***
[0.403] [0.853] [0.802] [1.459]
Time Trend 0.578*** 0.081 0.895** 1.124*** 1.134 2.124**
[0.144] [0.305] [0.372] [0.313] [0.709] [0.834]
Time Trend*Post 0.781*** −0.224 0.397 −1.187
[0.200] [0.383] [0.467] [0.848]
Shea Partial R2 0.58 0.60 0.77 0.60 0.59 0.79
Shea Partial R2 Post 0.70 0.82 0.66 0.84
Shea Partial R2 Interact 0.62 0.87 0.62 0.87
Hansen J -test p-value 0.26 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.36
Number of countries 47 47 47 47 47 47
Panel (B): log Population
Ln Life Exp. 1.079*** 0.382 0.384 1.088*** 0.228 0.215
[0.253] [0.384] [0.414] [0.293] [0.491] [0.517]
Ln Life Exp.*Post −1.662*** −0.908 −2.195*** −1.017
[0.293] [0.586] [0.361] [0.729]
Time Trend 0.482*** 0.828*** 0.827*** 0.755*** 1.277*** 1.285***
[0.117] [0.190] [0.206] [0.172] [0.300] [0.312]
Time Trend*Post −0.542*** −0.37 −0.860*** −0.624*
[0.121] [0.229] [0.188] [0.347]
Shea Partial R2 0.58 0.60 0.77 0.60 0.59 0.79
Shea Partial R2 Post 0.70 0.82 0.66 0.84
Shea Partial R2 Interact 0.62 0.87 0.62 0.87
Hansen J -test p-value 0.26 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.36
Number of countries 47 47 47 47 47 47
Results from 2SLS regressions, the dependent variable is log GDP per capita, y in Panel (A) and log population,
ln N, in Panel (B); the instrument for change in log life expectancy is predicted mortality change taken from
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the instrument for pre-/post-transitional is the set of geographic instruments
used by Lorentzen et al. (2008), see text for details. Robust, small sample corrected standard errors are in
brackets. All regressions are in long-difference specifications with two observations per country, for 1940
and 1980 in panel (A), and for 1940 and 2000 in panel (B), respectively. All specifications include a full set
of year and country fixed effects. The estimates correspond to the specifications in Table 2. Classification of
Pre-Transitional in 1940 and Post-Transitional in 1940 according to the analysis in Sect. 3. First stage F-tests
correspond to the partial F test of the instrument. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% level,
respectively
The positive effect of life expectancy may also be reinforced through different channels that
are related to reduced fertility rates. The demographic transition, during which the positive
relationship between life expectancy and population growth becomes negative, therefore
appears to be an important turning point for many direct and indirect channels through which
life expectancy may positively affect income per capita.
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The analysis performed in this paper considers the data and the instrumentation proposed
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) as benchmark, but relaxes the constraint of estimating
causal effects under the restriction of a linear empirical specification. Several empirical strat-
egies are applied to test the hypothesis of a non-monotonic causal effect of life expectancy
on income growth. This is done using interacted models that allow for a heterogenous effect
of life expectancy in countries pre and post demographic transition, using information on the
demographic status as of 1940. The results show that increases in life expectancy accelerate
income per capita in countries that had already experienced the onset of the transition by
1940. The effect is opposite in pre-transitional countries but sometimes statistically insig-
nificant, depending on the actual specification. In line with the theoretical predictions, these
patterns are complemented by statistically significant opposite effects on population growth.
The results are similar when applying OLS or alternative identification strategies proposed
in the literature. By documenting that the findings are qualitatively identical when using the
alternative instruments proposed by Lorentzen et al. (2008), the results help reconcile the
seemingly contradictory empirical findings in the existing literature. The analysis documents
that the mixed results obtained in the literature are not due to the use of different instrumen-
tation strategies. In the presence of non-monotonic effects, the estimates of the causal effect
of life expectancy on income growth obtained with a linear estimation framework may be
misleading since they crucially depend on the sample composition in terms of pre-transi-
tional and post-transitional countries. The key role of sample composition is documented by
weighted estimations on the full sample in a linear framework. The effect of life expectancy
on income growth is more positive the larger the weight given to countries that have larger
initial life expectancy or lower crude birth rates in 1940. These are the countries which are
more likely to be post-transitional. The results document a clear hump shape effect of life
expectancy on population growth which is to be expected from the demographic literature.
The analysis also provides evidence that life expectancy causally increases the probability of
observing the fertility transition. The results are robust to a set of additional checks, including
different classification criteria, instrumenting the demographic status of countries as of 1940,
and controlling for initial conditions.
The results therefore qualify the conclusions of the previous literature on the causal role
of life expectancy on income growth and suggest that life expectancy may have direct effects
on economic growth, although they appear to be non-monotonic and depend, in particular,
on the level of demographic development. Improvements in life expectancy may also have
indirect effects on income growth by increasing the probability of observing the onset of
the demographic transition. The findings have relevant policy implications given that most
countries in the world have undergone, or progressed towards, the demographic transition. It
is important to notice, however, that the analysis also documents that before the onset of the
transition life expectancy leads to increases in population growth. This suggests that policies
targeted at reducing mortality should be complemented by interventions aiming at reducing
fertility to limit the negative effects of population growth during the process of development.
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